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ABSTRACT 
The present study extends the literature on naïve psychology and naïve sociology, the 
everyday systems of thinking about others as psychological beings and members of social 
categories. A novel narrative paradigm was used to examine one way that these two 
systems might intersect, testing whether children varied their attributions of internal 
mental experience based on the social group membership of story characters. Seventy-
five children ages 6 to 10 and a comparison group of 33 young adults (all identifying as 
White/Caucasian) generated stories about characters whose membership in the social 
groups of gender and race was manipulated. The number of emotion, cognition, and 
intention attributions as well as the quality and complexity of mentalizing for narrative 
protagonists were assessed. It was predicted that participants would engage in more 
mentalization for characters that are gender and race ingroup members and less 
mentalization for characters that are outgroup members. However, contrary to 
predictions, results revealed that the mentalizing produced by both children and young 
adults did not differ based on the story characters’ membership in the basic social groups 
of gender and race. However, issues with the narrative paradigm may have obscured any 
subtle differences in mentalizing based on the identity of the story characters. Thus, the 
lack of demonstrated differences in mentalizing based on characters’ social group 
membership should not be taken as strong evidence of equal mentalizing across social 
groups. Additional work is needed to further test this question and better-explore this 
particular intersection of naïve psychology and naïve sociology. 
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Mental State Attributes in Narratives about Characters of another Gender and Race:  
An Intersection of Naïve Psychology and Naïve Sociology 
Developing a system for interpreting and explaining the behavior of others is one 
of the most important and challenging tasks young children face (Hirschfeld, 2008). 
Children construct models that help them make sense of others’ actions, which can be 
interpreted in a multitude of ways (Wellman, 2014). For example, Annie may walk across 
the room to pick up a doll because she wants to play with it, because she believes her 
little sister would like the doll, or because she is selfish and doesn’t want the other kids to 
play with it. These potential explanations of Annie’s behavior all reference her mental 
states (e.g., thoughts, beliefs, intentions, and desires), and thus fall under the primary 
model used to understand other’s actions which involves mentalizing or attributing 
mental states to others (Wellman, 1990). This everyday system of thinking about others 
as psychological beings, interactors, and selves is called naïve psychology (Wellman, 
Cross, & Watson, 2001). In addition to this psychological reasoning system, however, 
there is another system that is relevant to the everyday understanding of others’ behavior 
but does not require referencing mental states. This system, known as naïve sociology or 
the system of thinking about social categories (Hirschfeld, 2008), extends beyond the 
individual and references membership in social groups (Rhodes, 2012). Returning to the 
example of Annie, naïve sociology could allow one to infer that Annie picked up the doll 
instead of a nearby truck because she is a girl. Naïve psychology and naïve sociology are 
thought to be distinct cognitive systems that children employ in their everyday 
understanding of the social world (Hirschfeld, 2008). The purpose of the present study is 
to examine one area in which these two systems might intersect and influence each other: 
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that is, when making mental state inferences about others who are members of different 
basic social categories.  
Naïve Theories of How the World Works 
As children work to understand the world in early development they construct 
systems of foundational human knowledge (Wellman & Gelman, 1992). These systems 
are conceptualized as naïve theories, defined by Wellman and Gelman as nonscientists’ 
everyday understandings of basic bodies of knowledge about important aspects of the 
world, including naïve physics, naïve biology, naïve psychology, and, although less 
widely-recognized, naïve sociology. These naïve theories allow children to explain the 
phenomena they observe as well as make predictions or inferences about what they are 
unable to observe directly, such as gravity pulling a ball to the ground, food helping 
animals maintain life, intention and desire driving a person’s reach for a ball, and social 
expectations defining appropriate behavior towards others. Naïve theories are thought to 
be similar to scientific theories in that they are constructed and revised in order to 
reconcile data encountered through various experiences (see Wellman, 2014). Changes to 
naïve theories are constrained by initial conceptual knowledge and proceed in orderly 
conceptual progressions (Rhodes & Wellman, 2013). Naïve theories develop early and 
motivate further conceptual development as children come to understand the world 
(Wellman & Gelman, 1992).  
Naïve Psychology. One crucially important naïve theory in early development is 
naïve psychology—the everyday system of thinking about others as psychological 
beings. Naïve psychology is based on the cognitive capacity to recognize, infer, and 
reason about mental states, known as theory of mind (ToM; Wellman et al., 2001). 
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Research suggests that children actively construct and revise their ToM understanding 
through a series of conceptual achievements beginning in infancy (see Wellman, 2015). 
For example, in the first year of life, infants demonstrate an understanding of the 
intentional, goal-directed nature of human action (Brandone & Wellman, 2009; 
Brandone, Horwitz, Aslin, & Wellman, 2014; see also Woodward, 1999). Later, in the 
second year, infants broaden their mental state understanding to include recognition of 
others’ knowledge (Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2008) and perceptual 
experience (Meltzoff & Brooks, 2008). During this time, infants also come to understand 
the subjective nature of mental states, recognizing that others can desire, see, and know 
something different than the infant himself or herself (e.g., Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997). 
Further, although such an interpretation is controversial, new studies using inventive 
methodology suggest that infants may also have some form of understanding of the 
representational nature of mental states and that people act on the basis of their false 
beliefs (for a review see Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010; but see Haith, 1998).  
 Additional important conceptual shifts in ToM reasoning are also evident during 
the preschool years. These shifts are primarily assessed using Wellman and Liu’s (2004) 
ToM scale, which includes tasks designed to investigate when children explicitly 
demonstrate their understanding that (a) people can have different desires for the same 
thing (diverse desires); (b) people can have different beliefs about a common situation 
(diverse beliefs); (c) people who are uninformed are ignorant (knowledge access); (d) 
people act on their beliefs even when those beliefs do not reflect reality (false belief); and 
(e) people may display an emotion different from what they are actually feeling (hidden 
emotions). Children across multiple cultures tend to systematically proceed through this 
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series of understandings between roughly 2 and 6 years, with the transition between each 
step and the next taking three to six months (Peterson, Wellman, & Liu, 2005; Wellman 
& Liu, 2004). In reference to the classic false belief task in particular, children move 
from consistently failing this task at age three, to performing at chance, and then reliably 
passing it by age five (Wellman et al., 2001), although children as young as three 
demonstrate some implicit understanding of false belief (Rhodes & Brandone, 2014).  
 Consistent with the view that children actively construct and revise their ToM 
based on their interactions with the environment, research suggests that individual and 
cultural differences in the kinds of evidence children are exposed to regarding mental 
states are related to differences in when children pass specific ToM tasks. For example, 
children who are exposed to more talk about mental states in family discourse pass false 
belief tasks earlier than children who hear less mental state talk overall (Dunn, Brown, 
Slomkowski, Tesla, & Youngblade, 1991). Similarly, children who have siblings, and 
thus are likely exposed to more evidence regarding other’s intentions, beliefs, and 
desires, also pass false belief tasks earlier (Perner, Ruffman, & Leekam, 1994). The 
converse of these boosts to ToM understanding is also true. Children whose social-
conversational experiences are impoverished, such as deaf children born to hearing 
parents who are exposed to very little discourse about internal states, demonstrate 
sequential delays at each step in ToM understanding (Peterson & Siegal, 1995; Peterson 
et al., 2005). Further, despite the finding that most children across cultures follow a 
predictable sequence of ToM acquisition as measured by Wellman and Liu’s (2004) ToM 
scale (see Wellman, 2015), cultural differences in the amount of talk children hear about 
knowing versus thinking are related to when children pass the knowledge acquisition and 
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diverse beliefs task (Shahaeian, Peterson, Slaughter, & Wellman, 2011; Wellman, Fang, 
Liu, Zhu, & Liu, 2006).  
The advances in naïve psychology that occur as children construct and revise their 
ToM understanding play important roles in children’s real-world interactions. For 
example, passing false belief tasks predicts teacher-assessments of social competence 
(Astington, 2003; Peterson, Slaughter, & Paynter, 2007; Watson, Nixon, Wilson, & 
Capage, 1999). False belief understanding is also associated with children’s popularity 
with peers (Peterson & Siegal, 2002; Slaughter, Dennis, & Pritchard, 2002) and peer 
interactions (Dunn, Cutting, & Demetriou, 2000; Suway, Degnan, Sussman, & Fox, 
2012) including the ability to engage in pretend play (Astington & Jenkins, 1995) and 
games like hide and seek, as well as the ability to keep secrets (Peskin & Ardino, 2003). 
Although the relevance of ToM ability to social functioning across the lifespan is not as 
well documented (but see Brandone, 2015, and Wellman, 2015, for relevant reviews), 
there is preliminary evidence that the ability to infer and reason about others’ mental 
states is also related to social outcomes in young adults (e.g. Brandone, Werner, & Stout, 
2014).  
Overall, research on the development of naïve psychology suggests that children 
draw from the experiences they encounter in the environment to construct in a series of 
successive developmental milestones their understanding of others in terms of mental 
states such as intentions, knowledge, desires, and beliefs. It is clear that this naïve 
psychology holds important implications for understanding and navigating social 
interactions. However, although naïve psychology may be the primary way children 
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understand others (as argued by Wellman, 2015), it is not the only way children make 
sense of the social world. 
Naïve Sociology. The theory of social groups and categories is another system 
children construct to help them understand and navigate our intensely social world. One 
of the earliest to suggest that naïve sociology should be recognized as a system for 
understanding the social world, Hirschfeld (1995) argued that thinking about social 
categories such as race is “a precocious, domain-specific competency that coheres into a 
sophisticated system of reasoning” (p. 210). Naïve sociology has received considerably 
less attention than naïve psychology in the field of early conceptual development; 
however, social cognitive development researchers are beginning to recognize the 
importance of naïve sociology, calling it a “robust component of social cognition” 
(Rhodes, 2014, p.1; see also Banaji & Gelman, 2014; Wellman, 2015). 
Research in the area of naïve sociology suggests that the ability to make 
distinctions between people based on membership in basic social groups emerges early in 
development. There is evidence that even infants make distinctions between people on 
the basis of social categories (for a review see Spelke, 2013) such as gender (e.g. Katz & 
Kohkin, 1983; Miller, 1983), race (e.g. Kelly et al., 2005), age (e.g. Brooks & Lewis, 
1976) and language spoken (e.g. Mehler et al., 1988). One early indicator of this ability is 
the visual preference infants show in looking time studies for members of familiar social 
groups (see Kelly et al., 2005; Quinn, Yahr, Kuhn, Slater & Pascalis, 2002; Sangrigoli & 
de Schonen, 2004). Importantly, those who are most familiar to an infant are likely to be 
similar to each other and to the infant in terms of race, language spoken, religion, etc. 
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This preference for familiarity may provide an early starting point for group distinctions 
as well as ingroup preferences (Banaji, Baron, Dunham, & Olson, 2010).  
 The categories of gender and race (for respective reviews see Shutts, 2013, and 
Hirschfeld, 2008) appear to be especially important among the early emerging social 
categories (Shutts, Roben, & Spelke, 2013). At two years of age toddlers are able to label 
and sort photographs of people based on gender (Weinraub, Clemens, Sockloff, Ethridge, 
Gracely, & Myers, 1984) and begin to accurately label their own gender (Katz & Kohkin, 
1983). Children also use the social category of gender in their social evaluations of other 
children as potential playmates, as evident by the robust preference for same-gender 
friends and playmates that is observed in toddlers (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1987; Martin, 
1989; Shutts et al., 2013). Later in the preschool years, children begin to demonstrate an 
understanding of gender constancy, recognizing that gender has a physical basis and is 
not simply based on outward appearances (e.g., Bem, 1989). By middle childhood 
children reference deep-rooted beliefs about gender to structure their views of what 
preferences, interests, and behavior are appropriate and actively enforce these views in 
social interactions with peers (Martin, 1989; Martin et al., 2013; see also Miller, Margin, 
Fabes, & Hanish, 2013, and Shutts, 2013, for brief reviews). 
The acquisition of race concepts follows a similar course. Even toddlers 
demonstrate a preference for same-race playmates and tend to play more with same-race 
friends (although this finding may be limited to toddlers of the racial majority group; 
Katz & Kohkin, 1983). Building on the ability to label one’s own race (Katz & Kohkin, 
1983), preschoolers reference racial group membership when categorizing people and 
choosing friends (Ramsey & Myers, 1990), as well as when making inferences about 
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social relationships, as in determining who is more likely to be friends with whom (Shutts 
et al., 2013). Although somewhat controversial, there is some evidence that preschool-
aged children also recognize race constancy and understand that race (or at least skin 
color) is fixed at birth (Hirschfeld, 1996; but see Kinzler & Dautel, 2011). Importantly, 
by as young as five years of age, children’s social categorization based on race leads to 
biases including preferences for racial ingroup members (see Banaji, Baron, Dunham, & 
Olson, 2008, for a review) and prejudice towards racial outgroup members (Aboud, 
1988). 
The ease with which children form social categories such as gender and race 
stems, in part, from the fact that, from early in development, children are highly attentive 
to cues signaling social group membership, such as generic language (Rhodes, Leslie, 
Bianchi, & Chalik, under review), basic naming and labeling (Waxman, 2010; 
Diesendruck & haLevi, 2006), and simple visual distinctions (Dunham, Baron, & Carey, 
2011). Children can use such cues to delineate meaningful social groups even when the 
groups are artificial and unrelated to any real social categories (e.g. based on shirt color; 
Dunham et al., 2011). Once social groups are formed, they can be quite powerful 
conceptual tools. Children reference social category membership to make inferences 
about the behaviors and traits of others (Diesendruck & haLevi, 2006; Rhodes & Gelman, 
2008, 2009; Shutts et al., 2013), evaluate social obligations (Rhodes, 2014), and guide 
their own identity and social preferences (Dunham & Emory, 2015; Dunham et al., 
2011). Children also reference social categories to form generalized attitudes towards 
other groups that are implicated in intergroup problems such as stereotyping, prejudice, 
and discrimination (e.g. Aboud, 1988; Banaji et al., 2010; Dunham & Degner, 2008), 
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although it should be noted that there is not a consensus regarding whether these 
intergroup problems stem from a preference for ingroup members or derogation of 
outgroup members (e.g. see Zosuls et al., 2011, for a discussion of children’s attitudes 
towards same- and other-gender peers). 
Overall, naïve sociology and knowledge about social category membership serves 
as a general, abstract guide to understanding others’ behavior in a complex social world 
(Abrams, Rutland, Ferrell, & Pelletier, 2009; Rhodes, 2012) and clearly occupies an 
important place in early development. Understanding how young children learn to think 
about social groups not only is informative about children’s conceptual development, but 
also can shed light on important issues related to intergroup interactions.  
Intersection of Naïve Psychology and Naïve Sociology  
The evidence reviewed above suggests that children possess two cognitive 
systems designed to interpret and explain the behavior of others in the social world: one 
system, naïve psychology, whose purview includes intentional relationships between 
actions and mental states, and another system, naïve sociology, which is based on group 
assignments such as race and gender (Atran, 1996). Although some (Atran, 1996; 
Hirschfeld, 2008) have argued that these systems are independent and operate in distinct 
cognitive domains (see Hirschfeld, Bartmess, White, & Frith, 2007), naïve psychology 
and naïve sociology are nonetheless both applied to the common end of understanding 
others and navigating the social world. Thus, important questions remain regarding 
whether these systems are in fact independent and the extent to which they may overlap. 
Researchers have recently begun to advocate for examining the intersection of naïve 
psychology and naïve sociology in understanding others’ behavior. For example, 
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Wellman and Miller (2008) argue that the traditional focus on ToM in social 
understanding neglects the broader social-psychological context. Echoing this idea, 
Rhodes (2012) observes that work in this area tends focuses on how children reason 
about individual mental states, and there is a need to examine how children reference 
social causes extending beyond the individual, such as membership in social categories. 
Finally, Wellman, most recently, calls for future research to “establish the nature and 
development of social cognition in all its breadth and interconnections” (2015, p. 14), 
including examining naïve psychology’s intersection with naïve sociology. As these 
recommendations suggest, the intersection of these two lay theories represents a 
promising yet relatively unexplored area that has important implications for real-world 
application as well as for an understanding of conceptual development.  
 Although there are likely many ways in which naïve psychology and naïve 
sociology may be interrelated (see Diesendruck & haLavi, 2006 for one demonstration), 
this paper focuses on one important possible intersection: how the extent to which 
children engage in ToM reasoning (i.e., mentalizing) about a person might be influenced 
by their knowledge about that person’s social group membership. There are at least two 
possible models of this particular intersection of naïve psychology and naïve sociology. 
One possibility is that children’s understanding of the mind is human-general and applied 
equally to all people, regardless of group membership. On this view, children’s 
understanding of others as psychological agents would not be influenced by social group 
membership and the extent to which children engage in mentalizing would be equal for 
all groups of people. This seems to be the assumption in the ToM literature because 
group membership distinctions are typically not addressed. Indeed, studies showing that 
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children engage in ToM reasoning even with animals or self-moving objects (e.g. Luo & 
Baillargeon, 2005; Szendre, 1996) suggest that psychological reasoning is readily 
generalizable and thus may not be influenced by factors such as social group 
membership. However, a second, alternative possibility is that children’s understanding 
of others as psychological agents is in fact influenced by social group membership. On 
this view, children may modulate the extent to which they engage in mental state 
reasoning on the basis of group membership. In particular, children may attribute a richer 
and more complex psychological experience to members of their own social group as 
compared to outgroup members. Note that here the emphasis is not on the content or 
valence of the psychological characteristics children ascribe to others—although these 
may also differ based on social group membership and the stereotypes children hold 
about specific social groups (e.g., Aboud, 1988). Instead, the current focus is whether 
social group membership impacts the extent to which children engage in mentalizing and 
think about others as having rich and complex internal experiences. 
The traditional literature on ToM development does not examine whether group 
membership influences the extent to which children engage in mental reasoning about 
others. However, there is evidence that adults’ use of naïve psychology in everyday life is 
influenced by a variety of factors, including social group membership. For example, in 
their review Epley and Waytz (2010) argue that real-world psychological reasoning is 
influenced by both the context and the characteristics of the target under consideration in 
relationship to the perceiver, such that mentalizing is higher in interdependent contexts 
and toward targets who are close or similar to the perceiver, while mentalizing is lower in 
hierarchical contexts when the perceiver is in a place of power or when the targets are 
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distant or different outgroup members. Moreover, data suggest that there are systematic 
biases in adults’ attribution of complex secondary emotions (socially-constructed 
emotions such as embarrassment, admiration, and nostalgia) to outgroup members 
irrespective of emotion valence, resulting in infrahumanization (Haslam, 2006). 
Infrahumanization refers to the tendency to attribute more uniquely human, secondary 
emotions to ingroup members and fewer of these complex emotions to outgroup members 
while simultaneously attributing equal levels of primary, or non-uniquely human 
emotions (e.g., happiness, fear), across ingroup and outgroup members (most often racial 
boundaries, White vs. Black; Leyens et al., 2000). Since infrahumanization is the “denial 
of the ‘human essence’” (Haslam, 2006. p. 255) carried out without any explicit 
derogation of the outgroup, it is a subtle yet potentially powerful form of 
dehumanization.  
In addition to the findings of differential emotion attribution documented in the 
infrahumanization literature, one study examining differential attribution of other types of 
mental states based on characteristics of the target was identified. Kozak, Marsh, and 
Wegner (2006) showed that adults’ attribution of higher order cognition and intentional 
agency was greater for liked than for disliked targets and was reduced for targets who 
were victims of misfortune. These findings provide initial evidence that adults’ 
attributions of cognition and intentional agency are also influenced by features of the 
target under consideration.  
A handful of developmental studies examining infrahumanization in children (see 
Table 1 for an overview) suggest that children as young as age six (Costello & Hodson, 
2014; Martin, Bennett, & Murray, 2008) as well as older children and teenagers (Brown 
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& Eller, 2007; Martin et al. 2008; Vezzalia, Capozza, Stathi, & Giovannini, 2012) 
attribute more uniquely human emotions to ingroup members than to outgroup members 
in several intergroup contexts, including race (Black vs. White), immigration status 
(native vs. immigrant), school (private vs. public), and football team loyalty.  
Infrahumanization findings provide important initial documentation of the role of 
group membership in children’s attribution of mental states. However, these findings are 
limited to group differences in children’s reasoning about complex emotions. If naïve 
psychology and naïve sociology do intersect here and mental state reasoning is influenced 
by group membership, then corresponding effects should be observed for mentalizing in 
general and for other mental states, including higher order cognition and intentional 
agency. Yet, no studies have examined these types of mental state reasoning in intergroup 
contexts with children. Thus, the extent to which children’s mental state attribution is 
influenced by group membership remains a wide-open question that the present study 
was designed to address.  
The Present Study 
As is clear by the lack of studies addressing this intersection of naïve psychology 
and naïve sociology, important questions remain regarding whether children engage in 
mental state attribution differently based on social group membership. The aim of the 
present study is to address this gap by examining the extent to which children’s mental 
state attributes are dependent on the social group membership of the target under 
consideration.  
 An ideal way to examine this question is to explore how children spontaneously 
talk about the mental states of others who are members of different social groups. In 
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particular, narrative represents one such way to elicit talk about intentions, beliefs, and 
emotions from both children and adults, as narratives, by definition, are constructed from 
the actions, intentions, and mental states of characters (Bower & Rinck, 1998; Bruner, 
1986). Studies of narrative development document that children begin making mental 
state inferences in their stories at about age five (Griffin, Hemphill, Camp, Wolf, & 
College, 2013; Tompkins, Guo, & Justice, 2013).  Importantly, narratives are also 
developmentally appropriate and constitute an engaging research paradigm for use with 
child participants. Furthermore, this paradigm allows the elicitation of talk about the 
mental states of various characters while circumventing pressure to respond in socially-
acceptable ways when talking about or responding to questions regarding outgroup 
members. 
In the present study, mental state talk in narratives was used to examine how 
children think and talk about the intentions, thoughts, and emotions of target individuals 
in neutral contexts whose membership in basic social categories of gender and race 
(Black/White) was manipulated. This narrative paradigm allows testing of the question of 
whether children engage in mental state attribution differently based on the social group 
membership of the target under consideration. Six-year-olds were selected as the lower 
age limit because by age six children have achieved a level of sophistication in their 
understanding of others’ minds that allows them to reliably pass the classic false belief 
task as well as include mental state inferences in their narratives. Similarly, at this age 
children demonstrate a relatively sophisticated understanding of social categories and 
their implications (Abrams et al., 2009; Rhodes, 2012). Thus, if the systems of naïve 
psychology and naïve sociology indeed intersect here, they may do so by the age of 6. 
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Children up to age 10 were tested to examine the trajectory of this potential intersection 
of naïve psychology and naïve sociology as these systems continue to mature across 
childhood. Finally, a young adult comparison group was also included. 
Drawing from the infrahumanization literature documenting children’s 
differential attributions of complex emotions based on social group membership as well 
as children’s general sensitivity to and use of social groups as a means of understanding 
others, it was predicted that findings would support a model in which children’s 
attribution of mental states is influenced by group membership. Specifically, it was 
predicted that children would engage in more mentalization for characters that are gender 
and race ingroup members and less mentalization for characters that are outgroup 
members. This prediction was tested using two approaches. The first was to assess the 
quantity of emotion, cognition, and intention attributions children ascribe to story 
characters. This approach extends past work on differential attribution of emotion to also 
address potential differences in the attribution of cognitions and intentions. The second 
approach was to examine the quality of mentalizing for narrative protagonists by 
assessing the overall sophistication, richness, and complexity of the mental experience 
that children ascribe to story characters. This second approach allows a complementary 
examination of potential differences by focusing on the quality of children’s 
mentalization for the narrative protagonists. Because any differences in mental state 
attribution based on group membership are likely to be influenced by children’s 
familiarity and contact with diverse others, these constructs were also assessed.  
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Method 
 Participants 
 Data from 75 children ages 6 to 10 (41 males, 34 females) who were identified by 
their parents as primarily White/Caucasian were included in this study. The majority of 
parents had at least a college degree (76%; when reports were received for more than one 
parent, levels of education attainment were averaged). To examine potential changes in 
mentalizing patterns across development, child participants were divided into three age 
groups that were roughly equivalent in size: young (5.9 to 7.6 years; n = 27), middle (7.6 
to 9.3 years; n = 24), and old (9.3 to 11; n = 24). Children were recruited from a database 
of families who had previously expressed interest in research as well as from a charter 
school and after-school program in the Lehigh Valley. Children received a small prize as 
a token of appreciation for their participation. 
The young adult comparison group was composed of 33 college students (16 
males, 17 females) who identified as White/Caucasian and were native English speakers. 
These participants were recruited from the Lehigh Psychology participant pool and 
received class credit for their participation.  
All who expressed an interest in participating in the study were welcomed and 
treated equitably; however, only data from participants who identified as 
White/Caucasian were included in this report. The present study focused on 
White/Caucasian participants for both practical and conceptual reasons. First, White 
children are the most easily accessible population for our lab; thus, recruiting White 
children was most convenient. Second, focusing on White children allowed the creation 
of a simplified set of stimuli depicting racial ingroup and outgroup members. Third, as 
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members of the majority culture, the ToM reasoning of White people towards minority 
cultures carries important implications from a social justice standpoint. Finally, research 
shows that members of minority cultures experience more complex racial preferences and 
identities (for example, see Katz & Kohkin, 1983), and are thus beyond the scope of this 
study.  
Overall Design 
 Children and adults participated in a narrative generation task in which they were 
invited to tell stories about 8 different characters. Six characters were human, including 
two each of the following conditions: match, same gender and race as the participant; 
gender mismatch, same race but different gender from the participant; and race 
mismatch, same gender but different race from the participant. Two non-human 
characters were also included to anchor the range of mental state attributions and inform 
comparisons in the focal human conditions. These included a non-human animal (a bird) 
and an inanimate object (a rock). Participants also told two stories about themselves to 
orient them to the task. 
Story characters were introduced by presenting an image of the target person or 
non-human character along with an accompanying character name (or category label, in 
the case of the non-human controls). Context prompts were also provided to situate 
participants’ stories (e.g., “Tell me a story about Amy in school”).  
Stories were elicited in two blocks. Each block began with an introductory warm-
up story (about the participant), followed by a non-human control item (bird or rock), and 
one trial each of the three critical conditions (match, gender mismatch, and race 
mismatch) in a counterbalanced order. A brief break before moving on to the second 
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block of trials was included for child participants, during which they were engaged in a 
fun activity unrelated to the study. The entire task took an average of 20 minutes. 
Participants’ responses were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim for analysis. 
Additional details about the stimuli and procedure are provided below.  
Stimuli 
Story characters. Human characters were introduced by showing a photo of a 
person of the respective gender and race displaying a pleasant facial expression. Photos 
were standardized portraits of individuals in the same age group as the participants (6-10 
years and young adults). Images of children were drawn from photos publicly available 
on the internet and were standardized so that models wore grayscale clothing and were 
pictured with a gray background. The child images selected for use in this study were 
roughly matched on subjective ratings of age, attractiveness, happiness, niceness, and 
unusualness as determined by pilot testing on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Photos of 
young adults were drawn from the Chicago Face Database (Ma, Correll, & Wittenbrink, 
2015). This database provides extensive norming data for each individual model, such as 
physical attributes and subjective ratings. Images of young adults selected for use were 
roughly matched on subjective ratings of age, attractiveness, and unusualness. Norming 
and pilot data were also used to ensure that the selected stimuli clearly and equally 
exemplified the respective social categories of gender and race. The selected stimuli 
included two White/Caucasian females, two Black/African American females, two 
White/Caucasian males, and two Black/African American males for each age group 
(children and young adults).  
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Human characters were also introduced with fictional names. These names were 
selected from an ABC News (2006) listing of the top 20 boy and girl names rated as the 
most “white” or “black.” Image-name pairings were fixed; however, the order in which 
these characters were presented was counterbalanced across participants. Preliminary 
analyses confirmed that all image-name pairings were equivalent in eliciting stories and 
mentalizing content.  
Non-human characters were also introduced with accompanying images. The 
category label (i.e., “bird”, “rock”) was used in place of a character name. The testing 
block in which the bird or rock appeared was counterbalanced across participants.  
Additional cues for child participants. For children (but not young adults), the 
introduction of protagonists included additional images intended to further highlight the 
protagonist’s social category membership as the literature suggests that both skin-color 
(Dunham, Stepanova, Dotsch, & Todorov, 2014) and labels (Diesendruck & haLevi, 
2006; Waxman, 2010) are important in children’s understanding of social categories. To 
this end, smaller images of each protagonist’s purported family and friends were briefly 
presented when introducing child participants to the protagonists. Family members were 
matched to the race of the protagonist and friends were matched to the protagonist’s race 
and gender. The family and friend images were selected from those publicly available on 
the internet and were standardized by removing the background portion of the images. 
These images were then pilot tested using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to identify those 
that were similar on subjective ratings of attractiveness, happiness, niceness, and 
unusualness. The stimuli were also pretested to ensure that they clearly and equally 
exemplified the respective social categories of gender and race.  
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Story prompts. Semi-structured context prompts like those used by Stein (1988) 
served to structure the narrative generation task in this study1. Designed to be familiar to 
participants, the context prompts included school, playground (replaced with gym for 
young adults), party, park, shopping trip, and restaurant. Participants were asked to frame 
their stories within these contexts (e.g., “Tell me a story about Amy in school”). The 
order of these context prompts was fixed but the story characters were counterbalanced 
so the prompts were presented with various characters across participants.  
Narrative Procedure 
Children and young adults were tested individually with a researcher either in an 
on- campus laboratory or in a quiet space in the participant’s school. 
Children. To frame the narrative task, children received the following 
instructions: “We’re going to play a storytelling game! I’m going to give you a couple 
characters and I want you to tell me a story about each of them, like make up a story 
about something that happens to them or something that they do. There are no right or 
wrong answers – just tell me whatever kind of story you want to. You get to use your 
imagination! Would you like to do that?” To scaffold children’s use of mental state 
attributes in their narratives, children were also given definitions and relevant examples 
of thoughts and feelings and asked to include in their stories what the characters think 
and feel (see Appendix A for data collection script).  
Children were then introduced to the story characters one at a time on a digital 
screen and asked to generate a story about each. For human characters, children were 
presented with an image of the target character on a digital screen along with a statement 
about the character’s name, gender, and race. For example, “This is Amy. Amy is a girl. 
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She has light skin.” (see Appendix B for a complete list of prompts). These introductions 
were followed by pictures of and a statement identifying the character’s family and 
friends (e.g., “This is Amy’s family and these are Amy’s friends.”). Children were then 
provided with the context for their story (e.g., “Tell me a story about Amy in school”) 
and the well-known story opener “Once upon a time…” to prompt them to begin their 
story. The setup for the non-human stimuli was similar with the exception of providing 
family and friend information (e.g., “This is a bird. It has feathers and wings. Tell me a 
story about this bird in a tree”). 
Once children began their stories, they were prompted to continue until they 
indicated they had nothing more to add. Then children were prompted about the specific 
mental states of interest in this study, by asking “What did Amy feel/think/try to do in 
this story?” The additional prompts about the characters’ feelings/thoughts/intentions 
served two functions: (1) a safeguard that could be analyzed for mental state attributes if 
children did not spontaneously include them in their generated narratives, and (2) a 
reminder to include mental state content in narratives. Responses to these prompts are not 
reported here because participants included sufficient mental state references in their 
narratives.  
Young adults. The procedure for young adults was highly similar to that for 
children with a few key exceptions. Young adult participants received a similar set of 
instructions: “This is a storytelling task. So, I’m going to give you a few characters and I 
want you to tell me a story about each of them, like make up a story about something that 
happens to them or something that they do. There are no right or wrong answers – just 
tell me whatever kind of story you want to. You get to use your imagination! Please try to 
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spend about 2 minutes on each story. Also, feel free to take a minute to come up with a 
story if you need to.” 
Young adults were then introduced to the story characters one at a time on a 
digital screen and asked to generate a story about each. Because the race and gender of 
the characters was presumed to be already salient to young adults, adult participants did 
not receive explicit information about these factors or images and statements about the 
character’s family and friends. Thus, young adult prompts were streamlined (e.g., “This 
is Amy. Tell me a story about Amy in school.”). Young adults were also prompted to 
continue their stories until they had nothing more to add. However, they were not given 
additional prompts about the character’s feelings, thoughts, and intentions in the story to 
avoid drawing attention to mental states that might bias the responses of these more 
mature participants.  
Additional Measures 
  As a supplement to the narrative task, additional measures of interest were 
collected via questionnaires completed by young adult participants and the parents of 
child participants (see Appendix C and D). The parents of 24 of the 75 child participants 
did not complete the questionnaires because they were not present at time of testing.  
Demographics. Participants’ demographic information was collected, including 
age, gender, and race. Parents of child participants also indicated their own race and 
highest level of education obtained. 
Contact with diverse others. Since contact with diverse others may impact the 
constructs of interest, participants’ contact with people of different gender and other races 
was assessed. The minority racial composition of participants’ contacts in multiple 
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contexts was assessed on a four-point scale ranging from 1 “none or very few other 
race/ethnicity” to 4 “most other race/ethnicity,” based on measures used by Pahike, 
Bigler, and Suizzo (2012) and Eisenberg, Sallquist, French, Purwono, Suryanti, and 
Pidada (2009). The version for child participants asked parents to describe their child’s 
exposure to diverse others in a variety of contexts (school, classroom, neighborhood, 
activities, church/place of worship, friends, adult mentors/caregivers, and fill-in-the-blank 
“other”). The young adult version asked participants to answer similar questions about 
their own contact with racial minority members. Finally, the gender and race of 
participants’ top four closest friends was assessed.  
Narrative Coding 
Participants’ use of mental state attributes was coded using two distinct coding 
schemes: (1) a basic count of mental state attributes for narrative characters, and (2) a 
coding pass that captured the quality, complexity, and richness of mentalizing for 
protagonists.  
Quantity of mental state attributes. Based on the coding protocol used by Griffin 
et al. (2013), mental state attributes were defined as references to the protagonist’s mental 
states within three domains: (1) cognition, defined as references to cognitive functions 
such as knowledge, thought, and memory, (2) emotion, defined as feelings and affective 
responses such as fear and happiness, and (3) intentionality, defined as references to 
goals and volition, such as plans and desires. To avoid inflation due to rote repeats of 
mental state attributes, only references to distinct attributes were counted within each 
story while identical repeats within each story were not counted. Only references to the 
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mental states of the protagonist were counted; mental state attributions for any other 
characters were disregarded. 
Coders first identified each mental state reference and then categorized the 
reference by type (emotion, cognition, or intentionality; see Appendix E for coding 
manual). This quantitative coding was conducted by the principal investigator and a 
trained undergraduate research assistant. During coding, both researchers were blind to 
the protagonist type (match, gender mismatch, race mismatch). Agreement between 
coders was initially calculated on a subset of 18% of participants (14 children, 5 young 
adults). Once mental state attributes were identified as such, coders agreed 99% of the 
time on the categorization of the attribute type (emotion, cognition, intention). However, 
coders were in agreement on the identification of mental state attributes only 83% of the 
time. Because one coder identified a mental state attribute while the other coder did not 
17% of the time, often as a result of simple oversights due to the nature of the narrative 
data, transcripts were initially coded by one coder and then reviewed by the other coder 
to verify accuracy.  
Quality of mentalizing. The simple quantitative count of mental state attributes 
represents a relatively coarse initial pass at the data. Counting specific attributes may not 
be the best way to capture the extent of mentalizing for story characters. In some cases, 
multiple mental state attributes are provided yet they portray only a simplistic picture of 
internal experience. On the other hand, some sophisticated mental concepts, for example 
intentional deception or thoughtful reflection, can be conveyed without using very many 
specific references to mental states. To address the limitations of the simple count 
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approach, a more sophisticated coding scheme was created to capture the quality, 
complexity, and richness of mentalizing for narrative characters.  
After careful reading of the stories participants provided, a coding scheme 
capturing the quality of mentalizing was developed for the current study. This coding 
scheme drew from the Character Representation Scheme created by Nicolopoulou and 
Richner (2007) as well as the Sophistication of Mentalizing Response coding used by 
O’Connor and Hirsch (1999). The quality of mentalizing scheme was constructed to 
capture the range of mentalizing for story characters, from no mentalizing—portraying 
characters without any internal experience, to rich and sophisticated mentalizing—
portraying characters as having complex internal experiences underlying their actions and 
reactions.  
The quality of mentalizing for the protagonist of each story was evaluated on a 5-
point scale (see Appendix F for coding manual). A score of 0 was assigned when 
characters were inactive and were portrayed as inanimate objects or described in terms of 
physical features only. A score of 1 was given when characters were portrayed in terms 
of actions only, with no evidence of mentalizing. A score of 2 was provided for basic 
mentalizing, where characters were still primarily defined by actions but a few simplistic 
implicit or explicit internal experiences were introduced, such as references to internal 
experiences of emotion, cognition, intentionality, or perceptual experience. A score of 3 
was given when characters were portrayed as more complex psychological agents with 
well-developed internal experiences, evidenced by extensive detail about internal 
experiences, references to multiple mental state attributes, or references to complex 
internal experiences such as those contrasted with the experience of others or portrayed 
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as generalized patterns. Finally, at the highest level, a score of 4 was given when 
characters were portrayed in terms of thoroughly-developed advanced internal 
experiences such as intrapsychic conflict, introspective reflection, thoughtful strategic 
planning, self-monitoring of expression of internal experiences, or internal experiences 
developed in complex contrast with reality or the internal experiences of others. 
Mentalizing quality for each character was coded by the principal investigator who was 
blind to the condition while coding.  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics including the average number of words and mental state 
attributes along with the average mentalizing quality per story (excluding bird and rock 
control items) for participants in each age group are depicted in Table 2. Even the 
youngest children produced mental state attributes in their narratives, averaging roughly 
one distinct attribute per story. Although examination of differences in the types of 
mental state attributes children produce in their stories is beyond the scope of the present 
report, it is clear that all three mental state types—cognitions, emotions, and intentions—
were utilized by children of all ages as well as by the college-age participants. Moreover, 
even the youngest children’s average mentalizing quality score reached the scale’s 
midpoint of two (scores could range from zero to four) and young adults’ average quality 
score was roughly three.  
Data Analysis Plan 
  Repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to examine key 
questions related to participants’ use of mental state content in narratives. Some data 
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were skewed so a generalized estimating equations analysis was also conducted since it is 
better suited to handle non-normally distributed data. However, this analysis did not 
produce meaningfully different results, so only the repeated measures ANOVA analyses 
are reported here. The quantity of mental state attributes (number of emotion, cognition, 
and intention attributions) and the quality of mentalizing were analyzed in separate 
models.  
The first set of analyses in each section examined narratives about person 
characters only, excluding the rock and bird controls. Where possible, mental state 
attribution values were averaged across the two stories within each condition (match, 
gender mismatch, race mismatch) to create the within-subjects independent variable of 
interest, condition. The second set of analyses included comparisons between the person 
characters and the inanimate and animal control items to establish whether participants 
were sensitive to the identity of the characters in their stories. For models with the 
quantitative outcome variable of number of mental state attributes, mental state attribute 
type (cognition, emotion, intention) was entered as a within-subjects variable in addition 
to condition. Gender and age group (for children) were entered as between-subjects 
variables and the average number of words per story per participant was included as a 
covariate to control for overall verbosity. Data from children and young adults were 
analyzed separately to accommodate potential developmental differences. 
Finally, measures of participants’ diversity exposure were added to the models as 
covariates to examine the potential impact of participants’ contact with diverse others on 
the predicted trends.  
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Number of Mental State Attributes 
 The first set of analyses utilized the average number of distinct mental state 
attributions—cognitions, emotions, and intentions—produced in each story as the 
outcome variable of interest. See Table 2 for average and standard deviation of number of 
mental state attributions across the age groups. 
Do children differentiate between match vs. mismatch characters in their 
mental state attributions? Contrary to the prediction of more distinct mental state 
references for similar characters as compared to different characters, there was no main 
effect of condition in the model: F(2,134) = 1.98, p =.143. As depicted in Figure 1, 
children produced roughly equivalent numbers of mental state attributes for characters in 
the match (M = 0.63), gender mismatch (M = 0.67), and race mismatch conditions (M = 
0.56).  
Furthermore, there were no interactions between condition and age group, mental 
state type, gender, or average words per story (all ps > .197). Therefore, it is not the case 
that differences in children’s mental state attributes per condition appeared only for 
certain age groups, specific types of mental state attributes, one participant gender or the 
other, or at particular extremes of verbosity.  
There was one significant three-way interaction between condition, age group, 
and gender, F(4,134) = 3.28, p =.013. Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction 
revealed that the only significant differences were within the oldest age group (children 
ages 9 through almost 11). Within this oldest age group, boys produced more mental state 
attributes for gender mismatch (M = 0.81) than race mismatch characters (M = 0.39; p = 
.008; see Figure 2), a trend not in line with predictions. The oldest girls, however, showed 
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a pattern consistent with predictions: mental state attributions were higher for match 
characters (M = 1.20) than gender mismatch (M = 0.83; p =.016) and race mismatch 
characters (M = 0.92), although the difference between match and race mismatch did not 
reach significance (p =.102). Note that this three-way interaction appears to be an isolated 
effect as it occurs only in the oldest group of children and is not reflected in the college 
student comparison group (see below).  
Finally, results showed a main effect of age group, F(2,67) = 8.81, p < .001, and 
gender, F(1,67) = 8.02, p = .006, but no interaction between these two between-subjects 
variables (p = .576). The youngest children (M = 0.29) produced fewer mental state 
attributes on average than the middle (M = 0.78, p = .002) and oldest age groups (M = 
0.79, p = .001), which did not differ from each other (p = 1.00). On average, girls (M = 
0.78) produced more mental state attributes on average than did boys (M = 0.76; p = 
.006). There were no main effects of mental state type (p = .112). 
Do young adults differentiate between match vs. mismatch characters in 
their mental state attributions? As with the child participants, no main effect of 
condition was found in the college-age comparison group: F(2,56) = 1.46, p = .241 (see 
Figure 3). College students produced roughly equivalent numbers of mental state 
attributes for characters in the match (M = 1.31), gender mismatch (M = 1.15), and race 
mismatch conditions (M = 1.26).  
There were no interactions between condition and mental state type, gender, or 
average words per story (all ps > .555) for the college comparison group. Results showed 
a main effect of gender, F(1,28) = 7.34, p = .011, with women (M = 1.47) producing 
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more mental state attributes on average than men (M = 1.02). There was no main effect of 
mental state type (p = .661). 
Do children differentiate between human and non-human characters in their 
mental state attributions? The lack of consistent differences in use of distinct mental 
state attributes for similar vs. different characters begs the following question: Are 
participants sensitive to the identity of the protagonists of the stories they tell? To address 
this question, the non-human comparison items—the rock and the bird—were added to 
the model.  
 Results showed a main effect of condition in the model with the controls for child 
participants (see Figure 4): F(3.15,192.29) = 3.81, p = .010, Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction due to violation of the sphericity assumption as indicated by Mauchly’s test of 
Sphericity, χ2(9) = 32.37, p < .001. Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons revealed 
that, as predicted, children produced fewer mental state attributes for the rock (M = 0.38) 
than for the match (M = 0.63; p = .008) and gender mismatch (M = 0.64; p = .015) 
conditions. Comparisons between the rock and race mismatch (M = 0.56) did not reach 
significance (p = .127). Mental state attributions were also lower for the inanimate story 
character—the rock—than the nonhuman animal—the bird (M = 0.61; p = .033). 
 Do young adults differentiate between human and non-human characters in 
their mental state attributions? A main effect of condition was also observed when 
controls were added to the model for young adults (see Figure 5): F(2.82,78.82) = 4.75, p 
= .005, Greenhouse-Geisser correction due to violation of the sphericity assumption as 
indicated by Mauchly’s test of Sphericity, χ 2(9) = 18.94, p = .026. Bonferroni corrected 
pairwise comparisons revealed that, somewhat unexpectedly, it was the bird control (M = 
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0.67) that was lower than the match (M = 1.31; p < .001), gender mismatch (M = 1.16; p 
= .005), and race mismatch conditions (M = 1.26; p = .001) for college-age participants. 
The rock (M = 0.82) was different only from the match condition, and this difference was 
only marginal (p = .076). 
 Overall, although mental state attributions for the control conditions did not 
follow the predicted pattern exactly, the emergence of a main effect of condition in the 
models with the controls indicates that participants are at least somewhat sensitive to the 
identity of the characters of their stories.  
Mentalizing Quality 
 The second set of analyses used the evaluation of mentalizing quality for story 
characters as the outcome of interest. This approach was developed to address the 
limitations of the simple quantitative count of mental states by capturing the complexity 
and richness of mentalizing for story characters. Mentalizing quality was evaluated for 
each story on a 5-point scale, ranging from no mentalizing scored as 0 to sophisticated, 
complex, rich, and contextualized mentalizing scored as 5. See Table 2 for average and 
standard deviation of mentalizing quality for each age group.  
 Do children differentiate between match vs. mismatch characters in their 
mentalizing quality? There was a marginal main effect of condition for children’s 
mentalizing quality, F(2,134) = 2.62, p = .077 (see Figure 6). However, Bonferroni 
corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that the only difference between the match (M = 
2.25), gender mismatch (M = 2.32), and race mismatch (M = 2.16) conditions that 
approached significance was an unexpected difference between the gender and race 
mismatch conditions (p = .098). The predicted differences between match and mismatch 
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characters were not observed. There were no interactions between condition and 
children’s age group or average words per story (both ps > .174).  
As in the quantitative analysis, results again showed main effects of age group, 
F(2,67) = 7.78, p = .001, and gender, F(1,67) = 6.18, p = .015, on children’s mentalizing 
quality, with average mentalizing quality increasing with age and girls producing higher 
levels of mentalizing quality. 
 Do young adults differentiate between match vs. mismatch characters in 
their mentalizing quality? No main effect of condition was found in the college-age 
comparison group: F(2,56) = 1.46, p = .331 (see Figure 7). College students produced 
roughly equivalent mentalizing for characters in the match (M = 2.92), gender mismatch 
(M = 2.95), and race mismatch conditions (M = 2.85). There were no interactions 
between condition and gender (p = .628) or average words per story (p = .217). Unlike in 
the quantitative analyses, there was no main effect of gender on young adults’ 
mentalizing quality (p = .131). 
Do children differentiate between human and non-human characters in their 
mentalizing quality? The inanimate story character and the nonhuman animal controls 
were again added to the model to determine whether participants were sensitive to the 
identity of the protagonists of their stories in their mentalizing quality.  
Results showed a main effect of condition in the model with the controls for child 
participants (see Figure 8): F(2.48,153.47) = 21.08, p < .001, Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction due to violation of the sphericity assumption as indicated by Mauchly’s test of 
Sphericity, χ 2(9) = 78.39, p < .001. Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons revealed 
that, as predicted, the quality of children’s mentalizing was lower for the rock (M = 1.29) 
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than for the match (M = 2.25), gender mismatch (M = 2.29), and race mismatch (M = 
2.18) conditions, as well as for the bird (M = 2.30; all ps < .001).  
Do young adults differentiate between human and non-human characters in 
their mentalizing quality? A main effect of condition was also observed in the model 
with the controls for the college student sample (see Figure 9): F(2.21,61.73) = 11.07, p < 
.001, Greenhouse-Geisser correction due to violation of the sphericity assumption as 
indicated by Mauchly’s test of Sphericity, χ 2(9) = 47.97, p < .001. As with the child 
participants, Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that college-students’ 
mentalizing quality was lower for the rock (M = 1.72) than the match (M = 2.92), gender 
mismatch (M = 2.95), race mismatch (M = 2.85; all ps < .001), and bird (M = 2.51, p = 
.026). The quality of mentalizing was also lower for the bird than the gender mismatch 
condition (p = .031).  
 Overall, the quality of mentalizing for the control conditions followed the 
predicted pattern of lower mentalizing for the inanimate object and, to a lesser extent, the 
animal character. This trend provides evidence that the mentalizing quality of participants 
of all ages depended on the identity of the story characters, at least at a basic level.  
Contact with Diverse Others 
Finally, participants’ diversity exposure was assessed to examine its potential 
influence on the predicted trends in mentalizing. The minority racial composition of the 
people that participants had regular contact with was assessed on a four-point scale 
ranging from 1 “none or very few other race/ethnicity” to 4 “most other race/ethnicity” 
and was averaged across the multiple contexts (for children: school, classroom, 
neighborhood, activities, church/place of worship, friends, adult mentors/caregivers, and 
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fill-in-the-blank “other”; for young adults: school, activities, friends, work, residence 
hall,  church/place of worship, and fill-in-the-blank “other”) to form a marker of exposure 
to diverse others. The racial composition of participants’ four closest friends was also 
assessed.  
For children, the average minority racial composition of the people with whom 
they had regular contact most often fell within the first category, “none or very few other 
race/ethnicity” (49%) or the second category, “a few but less than half other 
race/ethnicity” (45%). For college students, the average minority racial composition of 
the people they had regular contact with most often fell within the second category, “a 
few but less than half other race/ethnicity” (65%). The majority of children (60%) and 
young adults (52%) did not have a racial minority member among their top four closest 
friends.  
Participants’ exposure to diverse others and number of racial minority members 
among their four closest friends were individually added as covariates to the models of 
the main analyses described above.  
Does children’s contact with diverse others influence their differentiation 
between match vs. mismatch characters? There was no main effect of average 
diversity exposure on children’s mental state attributions (p = .541) or mentalizing 
quality (p = .488). Furthermore, there were no interactions between diversity exposure 
and condition for mental state attributions (p = .146) or mentalizing quality (p = .773), so 
it was not the case that children differentiated between characters differently based on 
their exposure to diverse others. 
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Similar results were found for analyses including number of diverse close friends. 
There was no main effect of number of diverse close friends on children’s mental state 
attributions (p = .602) or mentalizing quality (p = .501). Furthermore, there was no 
interaction between number of diverse close friends and condition for mental state 
attributions (p = .101), so it was not the case that children differentiated between 
characters in their mental state attributions differently based on the number of their 
closest friends that were racially diverse.  
There was a marginally significant interaction between children’s number of 
diverse friends and condition for mentalizing quality, F(2,86) = 2.913, p = .060. 
However, partial correlations controlling for average words per story and gender showed 
no significant associations between number of diverse close friends and mentalizing 
quality in match (r = .06, p = .704), gender mismatch (r = -.08, p = .572), or race 
mismatch conditions (r = -.14, p = .339).  Overall, findings do not suggest that children’s 
exposure to diverse others impacts the extent to which they engage in mentalizing for 
ingroup and outgroup characters.  
 Does young adults’ contact with diverse others influence their differentiation 
between match vs. mismatch characters? Results showed main effects of diversity 
exposure on young adults’ overall mental state attributions, F(1,27) = 8.38, p = .007, and 
mentalizing quality, F(1,27) = 5.28, p = .030. Partial correlations controlling for average 
words per story and gender showed a negative relationship between diversity exposure 
and both average mental state attributions, r = -.49, p = .007, and average mentalizing 
quality across all person conditions, r = -.40, p = .030, suggesting that young adults 
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exposed to higher levels of diversity engage in less mentalizing about story characters 
overall.  
There was no interaction between diversity exposure and condition for number of 
mental state attributions (p = .143), so it was not the case that young adults differentiated 
between characters in their mental state attributions differently based on their exposure to 
racially diverse others. However, there was an interaction between diversity exposure and 
condition for mentalizing quality, F(2, 54)= 7.86, p = .001. Partial correlations 
controlling for average words per story and gender showed a negative relationship 
between diversity exposure and mentalizing quality only in the gender mismatch 
condition, r = -.61, p < .001 (match r = -.20, p = .301; race mismatch r = -.01, p = .924).  
Analyses including number of diverse close friends showed no main effect of 
close friend composition on young adults’ mental state attributions (p = .978) or 
mentalizing quality (p = .908). Furthermore, there were no interactions between number 
of diverse friends and condition for mental state attributions (p = .513) or mentalizing 
quality (p = .989). Thus, it is not the case that young adults differentiated between 
characters differently based on the number of their closest friends that were racially 
diverse. Overall, findings provide no clear evidence that young adults’ exposure to 
diverse others impacts the extent to which they engage in mentalizing for ingroup and 
outgroup characters. 
Discussion 
The present study used a novel narrative paradigm to explore whether children 
and a young adult comparison group varied their attributions of internal mental 
experience based on the social group membership of story characters. It was predicted 
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that participants would engage in more mentalizing for characters that are gender and 
race ingroup members and less mentalizing for characters that are outgroup members. 
This prediction was tested using two approaches: by assessing (1) the number of emotion, 
cognition, and intention attributions, and (2) the overall sophistication and complexity of 
mentalizing for narrative protagonists.  
 Results revealed that, contrary to predictions, both children and young adults 
produced roughly similar numbers of mental state attributes and levels of mentalizing 
quality for story characters regardless of the characters’ membership in the basic social 
groups of gender and race. Furthermore, it is not the case that there were differences in 
mentalizing only for certain age groups, specific types of mental state attributes, one 
participant gender or the other, or at particular extremes of verbosity. The one isolated 
three-way interaction suggesting differences in number of mental state attributes is not 
interpreted as meaningful because (1) it relied on very small cell sizes, (2) it occurred 
only with the oldest children but was not replicated in the young adult sample, (3) it was 
consistent with the predicted pattern only for girls while boys showed a different pattern, 
and (4) there was no theoretical reason to expect such an interaction. Overall, the current 
study provides no clear evidence of differential mentalizing based on the social group 
membership of story characters. 
Participants’ contact with diverse others was also assessed to examine its potential 
influence on the predicted trends in mentalizing. It was hypothesized that children may 
differ in how they mentalize regarding gender and race ingroup members based on their 
experience interacting with diverse others. However, it was not the case that children 
differentiated the number of mental state attributes or quality of mentalizing produced for 
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story characters based their exposure to diversity (number of their closest friends that 
were racially diverse or exposure to diverse others across multiple contexts). Likewise, 
young adults did not differentiate the number of mental state attributes or quality of 
mentalizing produced for characters based on the number of their closest friends that 
were racially diverse.  
While young adults’ exposure to diverse others across multiple contexts was not 
implicated in the number of mental state attributes they produced for characters, there 
were differences in young adults’ mentalizing quality based on diversity exposure. 
Specifically, diversity exposure was negatively related to mentalizing quality only for 
characters not of the same gender as participants. That is, young adults with more 
exposure to racial diversity showed lower quality mentalizing in stories about same race, 
different gender characters. It is not clear why this effect emerged; however, given its 
isolated nature and its lack of theoretical basis, no further speculation is provided. 
Overall, there was no evidence of the predicted differentiation in mentalizing between 
characters based on their social group membership for participants with more or less 
exposure to diverse others.  
Not surprisingly, variability in children’s mentalizing in this narrative task was 
best explained by age: the number of mental state attributes children produced and their 
mentalizing quality increased with age. This finding is consistent with naïve psychology 
literature documenting the development of mental state concepts across childhood (e.g. 
Wellman & Liu, 2004). There were also gender differences in the number of mental state 
attributions produced by both children and young adults as well as gender differences in 
the mentalizing quality produced by children (but not young adults). These differences all 
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favored female participants, perhaps because girls are socialized to be more sensitive to 
the internal experience of others (Eisenberg, Spinrad, & Sadovsky, 2006).  
The lack of observed differences in mentalizing based on the story characters’ 
social group membership in this study could be interpreted several ways. It may be the 
case that children and young adults engage in mentalizing equally for all people, 
regardless of their social group membership. This is consistent with the prevailing 
assumption in the literature on naïve psychology, which tends to overlook any potential 
interactions with naïve sociology. Indeed, children’s understanding of others as 
psychological agents may not be influenced by social group membership.  
Alternatively, this may be a meaningful intersection of naïve psychology and 
naïve sociology, as suggested by infrahumanization findings of differential attribution of 
uniquely-human secondary emotions based on group membership (e.g. Costello & 
Hodson, 2014), but the present narrative task may not have provided an effective 
paradigm for testing subtle differences in mentalizing. Speaking to this possibility, there 
was evidence from the non-human items that children and young adults were at least 
somewhat sensitive to the identity of the protagonists in the number of mental state 
attributes they produced, and, more clearly, in their quality of mentalizing within the 
narrative paradigm. However, despite this evidence, additional observations suggest that 
the narrative task may have masked more subtle differences in mentalizing based on 
characters’ social group membership. 
The narrative paradigm implemented here was selected as an age-appropriate 
means of eliciting talk from children about the mental states of various characters while 
circumventing pressure to respond in socially-acceptable ways when talking about or 
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responding to questions regarding outgroup members. However, several issues with the 
narrative paradigm became evident. In constructing their stories, both children and young 
adults seemed to draw from sources that might obscure differences in mentalizing based 
on the identity of the character. For example, participants often relied on general scripts 
or schemas to structure their stories (e.g. having cake and opening presents at a party). 
Also, as evidenced by periodic inadvertent switches to a first-person perspective and 
saying “I” instead of the character’s name, participants may have been constructing 
stories based on their own personal experience. Both of these strategies likely detract 
from and interfere with participants’ focus on the specific protagonists of their stories and 
thus may obscure any differences in mentalizing based on the identity of the characters. 
Furthermore, the observed variability in participants’ mentalizing in this task may be 
better explained by factors that might impact their production of narratives in this 
context, such as age, as demonstrated by these results, as well as creativity and 
extraversion, which were not assessed.  
The issues that became apparent with this narrative paradigm suggest that the lack 
of demonstrated differences in mentalizing based on characters’ social group membership 
should be interpreted with caution and not taken as strong evidence of equal mentalizing 
across social groups. Additional work is needed to further test this question and examine 
this particular intersection of naïve psychology and naïve sociology.  
Future Directions 
 The present narrative paradigm could be modified to be more useful for revealing 
differences in mentalizing for particular targets. One such modification would be to 
create cartoon caricatures that depict a basic storyline in which protagonists are 
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presented. Participants could then interpret the illustration and tell the story as they see it. 
The graphical representation and additional story stem content would likely help 
participants focus on the protagonist instead of relying on personal experience or basic 
schemas, so that variability in the extent to which mental state experiences are developed 
would be more closely linked to the protagonists and their social group identity. Another 
modification would be to supply children with the beginnings of complex narratives and 
ask them to complete the stories or tell what comes next. Providing complexity in the 
story stem would help participants create more engaging and sophisticated stories that 
would invite higher levels of mentalizing for protagonists and thus yield more meaningful 
variability in mentalizing.   
 An alternative to the narrative paradigm is currently underway to further test for 
differences in mentalizing based on the social group membership of targets. To avoid the 
confounds that became apparent with the present narrative paradigm, a more direct test 
using a card sort task and Likert scale ratings was developed based on those used 
successfully in infrahumanization studies with children (Costello & Hodson, 2014; 
Vezzalia et al., 2012). In this ongoing study, children are presented with mental state 
attributions on cards read aloud to them, including attributions of cognitions, emotions, 
and intentional agency (e.g. Knows what’s going on around them; Feels a lot of different 
feelings; Plans things out before doing them). Using boxes marked with pictures of a 
same sex Black and White child, children are asked to sort each attribution card to 
indicate to whom the attribute applies (neither, one child but not the other, or both). 
Children are then asked to indicate how much each attribute is true of the selected 
recipients using a Likert scale ranging from “A little” to “A lot” with an accompanying 
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visual aid of circles increasing in size. With this more direct methodology, it is predicted 
that differences will be observed paralleling infrahumanization effects found using 
similar methods (Costello & Hodson, 2014; Vezzalia et al., 2012), such that children will 
attribute mental states more to targets who are similar to them and less to targets who are 
racial outgroup members.  
 In addition to the planned follow-up using an alternative paradigm, the present 
narrative data set is rich and can be further mined in the future. Other potentially 
interesting factors could be examined, such as narrative coherence, quality of emotion 
talk, and valence of character portrayal, just to name a few. 
Limitations 
 In addition to the limitations that became apparent with the narrative paradigm 
already discussed above, several other limitations constrain the interpretation of the 
findings of this study. First, the sample was very homogenous, necessarily so in terms of 
race but also involuntarily so in terms of socioeconomic status; thus, the generalizability 
of these results is limited. Furthermore, several features of the task protocol may have 
influenced results in ways that should be noted. Although even the youngest children 
included mental state attributes in their stories, they did so infrequently. In anticipation of 
this, children were explicitly asked to include what the characters thought and felt in their 
stories and then at the end of each story they were asked what each character thought, 
felt, and tried to do in the story. These additional prompts were sometimes anticipated by 
children who would then produce mental state attributes that seemed forced instead of 
naturally-flowing. Thus, these results cannot be interpreted as documenting spontaneous 
mentalizing in narratives.   
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Conclusion 
 The present study extends the literature on naïve psychology and naïve sociology 
by using a novel narrative paradigm to examine one way that these two systems might 
intersect, testing whether children and a young adult comparison group varied in their 
attributions of internal mental experience based on the social group membership of story 
characters. Although it was predicted that participants would engage in more mentalizing 
for characters that were gender and race ingroup members and less mentalizing for 
characters that are outgroup members, results revealed that the mentalizing produced by 
both children and young adults did not differ based on the story characters’ social 
category membership. This lack of differences in mentalizing held with both the number 
of emotion, cognition, and intention attributions as well as with the quality and 
complexity of mentalizing for narrative protagonists, but issues with the narrative 
paradigm that became apparent suggest that any differences may have been obscured. 
Additional work is necessary to better-explore this question and further examine how 
naïve psychology and naïve sociology might interact both in this particular context and in 
others, as the crossroads of these two systems represents a fertile ground for future 
research. Studying the relation between lay theories of people as psychological agents 
and members of social categories remains an important endeavor to further our 
knowledge of how children understand other people. 
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Footnotes 
1 Several strategies for eliciting narratives were initially piloted with 10 child 
participants to determine the most effective method. The semi-structured context prompt 
set was piloted alongside entirely open-ended prompts, in which participants were 
introduced to the protagonist and simply asked to tell a story about the character (e.g., 
“Tell me a story about Amy.”), as well as more structured story beginnings modeled after 
those created by Wang and Leichtman (2000; e.g., “One day, Amy goes to the market 
with her mom. There are so many toys in the store! Amy can’t take her eyes off them. 
Then she gets lost and can’t find her Mom. Tell me what happens next.”). The open-
ended and semi-structured context prompts appeared to be roughly similar in the 
narrative quality and number of mental state attributes that they elicited, while the 
structured story beginnings appeared to be slightly less effective. Accordingly, and 
because creating equivalent story beginnings proved to be somewhat complex, the 
structured story beginnings were eliminated. The semi-structured context prompts were 
ultimately selected over the entirely open-ended prompts because the context information 
served as a starting point for stories and seemed to aid children in beginning their 
narratives effectively.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Overview of literature examining children’s attribution of uniquely-human 
emotions based on group membership (infrahumanization). 
 
 
Study Age Groups Method Findings 
Costello & 
Hodson 
(2014) 
6-10 Black vs. 
White 
children 
Sort uniquely 
human/not emotions  
and traits in 
black/white/neither 
child's box (photo 
stimuli) 
White children 
attributed fewer 
uniquely human traits 
and emotions to Black 
vs. White children, no 
difference in non-
uniquely human  
Vezzali, 
Capozza, 
Stathi, & 
Giovannini 
(2012) 
9 Italian vs. 
immigrant 
children 
Indicate on 5-point 
Likert scale 
(Definitely - 
Definitely Not) how 
much child is likely 
to feel 2 positive and 
2 negative uniquely 
human/not emotions 
Children assigned more 
non-uniquely than 
uniquely human 
emotions to outgroup 
members 
Martin, 
Bennett, & 
Murray 
(2008) 
6-7 & 
10-11 
Fans of own 
vs. rival 
football 
team 
Project the intensity 
of uniquely 
human/not emotions 
using 7-point circle 
Likert scale 
Children predicted 
ingroup would 
experience secondary 
emotions more intensely 
than primary; no such 
distinction for outgroup 
Brown & 
Eller (2007) 
11-16 Private vs. 
public 
school 
Indicate which of 16 
emotions (8 
uniquely human, 8 
not) each character 
in 4 vignettes might 
feel 
More secondary 
emotions attributed to 
ingroup than outgroup; 
difference for the 
primary emotions was 
negligible 
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Table 2. Means and standard deviations by age group for average number of words and 
mental state attributes produced per story and average mentalizing quality.  
 
 
   Number of Mental State Attributes  Mentalizing 
Quality 
  
Words Overall Cognitions Emotions Intentions 
Age n M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD  M SD 
5.9-7.6 27 76 50 0.9 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3  1.9 0.5 
7.6-9.3 24 122 76 2.1 1.6 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.6  2.4 0.7 
9.3-11 24 172 136 2.3 1.9 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8  2.4 0.7 
Young 
adults 
33 201 120 3.7 1.8 1.2 0.7 1.2 0.7 1.3 0.8  2.9 0.6 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Mean quantity of mental state attributes by condition for children. 
  
 
Error bars denote standard error 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean quantity of mental state attributes by condition and gender for the oldest 
children. 
  
 
Error bars denote standard error 
* Denotes p < .05 
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Figure 3. Mean quantity of mental state attributes by condition for young adults. 
  
 
Error bars denote standard error 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Mean quantity of mental state attributes by condition with controls for children. 
  
 
Error bars denote standard error 
* Denotes p < .05 
** Denotes p < .01 
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Figure 5. Mean quantity of mental state attributes by condition with controls for young 
adults. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Error bars denote standard error 
* Denotes p < .05 
** Denotes p < .01 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Children’s average mentalizing quality by condition. 
  
 
Error bars denote standard error 
 
** 
** 
** 
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Figure 7. Young adults’ average mentalizing quality by condition. 
  
 
Error bars denote standard error 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Children’s average mentalizing quality by condition with controls. 
  
 
Error bars denote standard error 
** Denotes p < .01 
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Figure 9. Young adults’ average mentalizing quality by condition with controls. 
  
 
Error bars denote standard error 
* Denotes p < .05 
** Denotes p < .01 
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Appendix A 
 
Data Collection Procedure 
 
Warm-Up 
 Chat about what they have done today/so far this summer etc. 
 
Instructions:  
We’re going to play a storytelling game!  
I’m going to give you a couple characters and I want you to tell me a story 
about each of them, like make up a story about something that happens to 
them or something that they do.  
In your stories I want you to talk about what the characters think and feel.  
Thoughts are things you think in your head about something, like I think it’s 
sunny outside or I think this is a small room or I like that rug.  
 point to head  
Feelings are things you feel on the inside, like sad, happy, scared, or mad. 
 point to chest 
There are no right or wrong answers – just tell me whatever kind of story 
you want to – you get to use your imagination!  
Would you like to do that? 
 
 
Prompts: Give only vague feedback – oh, ah, wow, uh huh, mmm, ok 
Then what happens? 
Can you tell me some more?  
Anything else? 
 
Story Questions: 
1. What did ____ try to do in this story?      
2. What did ____ think in this story?  point to head   
3. What did ____ feel in this story?  point to chest   
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Appendix B 
 
Narrative Generation Prompts 
  
Character Introductions 
This is _____. ____ is a girl. She has light skin. This is ___’s family. These are ____’s friends. 
This is _____. ____ is a girl. She has dark skin. This is ___’s family. These are ____’s friends 
This is _____. ____ is a boy. He has light skin. This is ___’s family. These are ____’s friends 
This is _____. ____ is a boy. He has dark skin. This is ___’s family. These are ____’s friends 
 
Semi-structured context prompts for children: 
1. Tell me a story about _____ in school. 
2. Tell me a story about _____ at the pool.* 
3. Tell me a story about _____ at a party. 
4. Tell me a story about _____ on the playground. 
5. Tell me a story about _____ on a shopping trip. 
6. Tell me a story about _____ at a restaurant.  
 
Semi-structured context prompts for young adults: 
1. Write a story about _____ in school. 
2. Write a story about _____ at the gym.* 
3. Write a story about _____ at a party.  
4. Write a story about _____ at the park.* 
5. Write a story about _____ on a shopping trip. 
6. Write a story about _____ at a restaurant.  
 
*Different prompt for young adults vs. children.  
 
Nonhuman Controls/Anchors for Comparisons 
Non-human: Rock  
This is a rock. Tell me/write a story about this rock on top of a hill. 
 
Non-human: Bird 
This is a bird. Tell me/write a story about this bird in a tree. 
 
Warm-up/transition stories about self 
Self Narrative 1  
Tell me/write a story about you at home. 
 
Self Narrative 2 
Tell me/write a story about you in the doctor’s office (dentist’s office for young adults). 
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Appendix C 
 
CONFIDENTIAL DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Gender:  Male   Female          Age: ________          Ethnicity and Race (check all that apply): 
         White/Caucasian    Hispanic/Latino 
 Asian    Native American 
 Black/African American  N/A or Unknown        
 Hawaiian/Pacific Islander     Other 
(________________) 
 
The following questions inquire about the racial and ethnic diversity of the individuals with which you have frequent contact.  
Please respond as accurately as possible but feel free to skip any questions you don’t feel comfortable answering. 
 
Please list the first name of up to 4 of your closest friends. Estimate how often you spend time with each friend (1 = never, 4 = 
all the time). Lastly, indicate the gender and race of each of your friends. 
 
First Name               Time (circle) Gender (circle)    Ethnicity and Race (check all that apply) 
1.     1   2   3   4  Male  Female        White     Asian     Black     Hispanic    Other 
2.     1   2   3   4  Male  Female        White     Asian     Black     Hispanic    Other 
3.     1   2   3   4  Male  Female        White     Asian     Black     Hispanic    Other 
4.     1   2   3   4  Male  Female        White     Asian     Black     Hispanic    Other 
 
Please circle the number that best represents the diversity of individuals you have frequent contact with in the settings listed 
below using the following key: 
 
1 = none or very few other race/ethnicity      
2 = a few but less than half other race/ethnicity 
3 = about half other race/ethnicity           
4 = most other race/ethnicity      
 
Lastly, for each setting, estimate the percentage of individuals you have frequent contact with that belong to each 
Ethnicity/Race.  Leave blank if N/A. 
 
Setting                Diversity      Estimated Percentages    
School    1  2  3  4       White: ___%   Asian: ___%   Black: ___%   Hispanic: ___ %   Other: ___% 
Activities (clubs, teams)  1  2  3  4       White: ___%   Asian: ___%   Black: ___%   Hispanic: ___ %   Other: ___% 
Friends    1  2  3  4       White: ___%   Asian: ___%   Black: ___%   Hispanic: ___ %   Other: ___% 
Work    1  2  3  4       White: ___%   Asian: ___%   Black: ___%   Hispanic: ___ %   Other: ___% 
Residence Hall   1  2  3  4       White: ___%   Asian: ___%   Black: ___%   Hispanic: ___ %   Other: ___% 
Church/place of worship  1  2  3  4       White: ___%   Asian: ___%   Black: ___%   Hispanic: ___ %   Other: ___% 
Other:_________________ (list)  1  2  3  4       White: ___%   Asian: ___%   Black: ___%   Hispanic: ___ %   Other: ___% 
Thank you for your responses! 
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Appendix D 
 
CONFIDENTIAL DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Child’s DOB: ___/___/_______   Child’s Gender:  Male   Female 
 
Child’s siblings (please circle gender): 
1.         Male  Female 
2.         Male  Female 
3.         Male  Female 
4.         Male  Female 
5.         Male  Female 
6.         Male  Female  
 
Child’s Ethnicity and Race (check all that apply): 
   White/Caucasian     Hispanic/Latino 
 Asian     Native American    
 Black/African American   N/A or Unknown        
 Hawaiian/Pacific Islander                 Other (________________)  
 
Please indicate information about the contributing members of your household. 
You             Spouse/Partner (leave blank if N/A) 
Gender:  Male   Female          Gender:  Male   Female 
Ethnicity and Race (check all that apply):        Ethnicity and Race (check all that apply):  
 White/Caucasian     White/Caucasian 
 Asian       Asian 
 Black/African American    Black/African American 
 Hawaiian/Pacific Islander    Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 
 Hispanic/Latino      Hispanic/Latino 
 Native American     Native American 
 N/A or Unknown            N/A or Unknown 
 Other (________________)     Other (________________) 
Highest level of education obtained:          Highest level of education obtained: 
 Less than high school     Less than high school 
 High school/GED equivalent    High school/GED equivalent 
 Some college      Some college 
 College degree      College degree 
 Post college degree     Post college degree 
 
How did you first hear about the Cognitive Development Lab?  
 Friend  
 By mail 
 Brochure from doctor’s office 
 Facebook 
 Internet 
 Poster in local business  
  Other: ________________________  
 
Would you like to receive a copy of 
the Cognitive Development Lab 
newsletter summarizing the results 
of this and other studies going on in 
our lab? 
 Yes    No 
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The following questions inquire about the racial and ethnic diversity of the individuals your child has frequent contact 
with outside of your immediate family.  Please respond as accurately as possible but feel free to skip any questions you 
don’t feel comfortable answering. 
 
 
Please list the first name of up to 4 of your child’s closest friends. Estimate how often your child spends time with each 
friend (1 = never, 4 = all the time). Lastly, indicate the gender and race of each of the friends. 
 
First Name              Time (circle) Gender (circle)    Ethnicity and Race (check all that apply) 
1.     1   2   3   4  Male  Female        White     Asian     Black     Hispanic   
 Other 
2.     1   2   3   4  Male  Female        White     Asian     Black     Hispanic   
 Other 
3.     1   2   3   4  Male  Female        White     Asian     Black     Hispanic   
 Other 
4.     1   2   3   4  Male  Female        White     Asian     Black     Hispanic   
 Other 
 
Please circle the number that best represents the diversity of individuals your child has frequent contact with in the 
settings listed below using the following key: 
 
1 = none or very few other race/ethnicity      
2 = a few but less than half other race/ethnicity 
3 = about half other race/ethnicity           
4 = most other race/ethnicity      
 
Lastly, for each setting, estimate the percentage of individuals your child has frequent contact with that belong to each 
Ethnicity/Race. Leave blank if N/A. 
  
Setting                Diversity      Estimated Percentages    
School    1  2  3  4       White: ___%   Asian: ___%   Black: ___%   Hispanic: ___ %   Other: ___% 
Classroom   1  2  3  4       White: ___%   Asian: ___%   Black: ___%   Hispanic: ___ %   Other: ___% 
Neighborhood   1  2  3  4       White: ___%   Asian: ___%   Black: ___%   Hispanic: ___ %   Other: ___% 
Activities (clubs, teams)  1  2  3  4       White: ___%   Asian: ___%   Black: ___%   Hispanic: ___ %   Other: ___% 
Church/place of worship  1  2  3  4       White: ___%   Asian: ___%   Black: ___%   Hispanic: ___ %   Other: ___% 
Friends    1  2  3  4       White: ___%   Asian: ___%   Black: ___%   Hispanic: ___ %   Other: ___% 
Adult mentors/caregivers  1  2  3  4       White: ___%   Asian: ___%   Black: ___%   Hispanic: ___ %   Other: ___% 
Other:_________________ (list)  1  2  3  4       White: ___%   Asian: ___%   Black: ___%   Hispanic: ___ %   Other: ___% 
 
Thank you for your responses! 
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Appendix E 
 
Narrative Mental State Frequency Coding:  
Cognition, Emotion, & Intentionality 
 
Cognition – knowledge, thought 
 Know 
 Think/thought  
Idea 
 Understand/clarity/make sense 
Learn/associate 
 Decide  
 Reason/figure out 
Recognize/realize  
Analyze 
 Guess/suppose 
 Bet/anticipate/expect 
Remember 
 Conscious/alert/distracted 
 Curious/inquisitive 
 Wonder/ponder 
 Interest/disinterest/bored 
 Dream 
Impressed/amazed  
 Surprised 
Notice/observe 
Explore 
Discover 
Found out (but not just found)  
 Smart/intelligent 
 Pretend 
 Trick 
 Sure/unsure 
Obsessed 
 
Intentionality – volition, goals, plans, desires, 
preferences  
Try to (if indicating direction of effort or 
desired outcome, NOT just 
sampling/trial) 
 Plan/forethought  
 On purpose 
Mean/Meant to 
 Decide 
Choose/pick/select 
 Wants/desires/wishes 
Hopes* (if orienting to specific outcome) 
Needs (if psychological needs)  
Prefer/love*/like/favorite/rather/keen/into 
(i.e. she’s into that music, she loves it) 
Indifference/don’t care* (if not affect-
driven) 
Going to/let’s (if planning action) 
 
 
 
 
 
Emotion – feelings, affective responses 
Felt/feels (if referring to an emotional 
experience not otherwise specified) 
Mood – good/bad 
Happy/glad (but not happily ever after) 
Calm/content 
 Scared/afraid/frightened/fear/startled 
Anxious/nervous/worried 
 Mad/angry 
 Sad/depressed 
Cry (if linked to an emotional experience, 
not just in response to physical pain) 
Upset 
Stress 
Disappointed 
Lonely  
Concerned/cares* (if cares for __) 
Hurt (if referring to an emotional 
experience) 
Affection/attachment/love* (if referring to 
a person) 
Sympathy/compassion/“feeling bad for” 
Guilt/remorse/shame/embarrassment 
Hope* (if affect-laden) 
Pride/conceit 
Excitement/thrill 
Joy/enjoy  
Startle/shock 
Admiration 
Disgust/hate/rancor 
Cranky/crabby/grumpy/irritable/bad 
mood/cross 
Nostalgia 
Entertaining/amusing/funny 
Fun/funny 
Alright/ok (as in to be all right)  
Traits directly linked to an emotion (such as 
shy) but not behavioral traits more 
removed from emotion (so not 
aggressive or outgoing/introverted) 
 
 
 
Note: 
- Mental state attributes only count if 
given in reference to the protagonist (i.e. 
not the narrator or any other characters). 
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Coding instructions 
 Type CTRL J to run the prep MACRO 
o The MACRO excel file must be open in order for the MACRO to run 
o The MACRO file is called “PERSONAL” in the Narrative > Transcriptions folder 
 
 Select the spreadsheet with the coding copy, “MenState.XX” 
 
 Rename the spreadsheet, changing the XX to your initials 
 
 Code for mental state attributions for the protagonist (“she didn’t know”), but NOT for the 
narrator (“I don’t know”; unless it’s a story about the narrator and they are talking from 
their frame of reference in the story) and NOT for any other characters that might be 
introduced in the story (“her friends didn’t know”) 
 
 Collective mental states: code if the protagonist is included in the group of people 
experiencing a mental state 
 
 Repeats: if a mental state word is immediately repeated verbatim in a way that suggests it’s 
a stutter or mindless repeat, count only the first instance. Otherwise, count both words 
 
 Read through each block of text 5 times: 
1. Initially familiarize yourself with the content 
2. Identify cognitions, changing their font color to blue 
3. Identify emotions, changing their font color to purple 
4. Identity intentions, changing their font color to green 
5. Finally, count the number of each kind of mental state attribute and enter the totals 
in their respective columns. 
 
 Sometimes Excel doesn’t display the full content of cells with particularly long segments, so 
always check to make sure that you can see the full content 
You can adjust the column width to be as wide as needed so that you can see all the 
content 
 
 If you notice anything weird that you have questions about, change the font of the word in 
question to red and highlight the participant number in the “Narrative Coding Sheet” file 
 
 Once coding is complete, mark it in the “Narrative Master Sheet” file 
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Appendix F 
 
Mentalizing Quality Coding Scheme 
 
Goal: capture the quality/sophistication/complexity/richness of mentalizing for target story 
characters. Ranging from no mentalizing (level 0, character does not act, or level 1, character 
depicted simply as an actor), to sophisticated, complex, rich, and contextualized mentalizing (level 4, 
character depicted as a person). 
 
 
0. Inactive. Character is portrayed as an inanimate object (acted upon but does not act) OR in the 
case of animate characters, is only described (does not act or participate in actions). 
It (the rock, the character) was big. Somebody steps on it. The rock wasn’t hard and then it 
got squished. A kid saw the rock. And then he saw the rocks and then he picked them up and 
played with them. 
 
 
1. Actors. Actors are portrayed simply in terms of actions: the narrative is a sequence of actions with 
no indication of the character’s internal experiences 
And she did some math, she did some reading, and then it was recess. And then they went 
outside and they played on the playground and they played a game. Her and her friends 
played a game. And then they went back inside then it was time to go home. And she went 
on the bus then she got off and went home.   
 
 
2. Psychological Agents: Basic. Basic psychological agents are still primarily defined by actions but a 
few basic internal experiences or responses are introduced, evidenced by one or more of the 
following:  
 Basic references to 1 or 2 intentions (implicit or explicit, such as try, want, need, decide): 
actions framed as goal-directed with basic underlying motivations 
“He was playing tag and he dropped off the ladder to get away from the tagger” 
 References to perceptual/physical experience  
see, hear, hunger, thirst, pain (must clearly refer to character experiencing pain, not 
just that she hurt herself) 
 Basic speech produced by character 
 “And then she finished her picture and said, ‘I’m done!’” 
 1 or 2 unique explicit/implicit references to internal experiences such as thoughts and 
emotions (but these are only cursory and not well-developed) 
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3. Psychological Agents: Full. Full psychological agents are portrayed as having distinct psychological 
experiences that serve as the basis for actions or are thoroughly-developed responses to 
circumstances, evidenced by one or more of the following: 
 More advanced description of intentionality, evidenced by:  
Multiple steps to carry out goals, or 
Explicit references to intentionality (try, want, need, decide) linked with other 
internal experiences (thoughts, feelings)  
 References to multiple (3+) unique explicit/implicit internal experiences (thoughts, feelings, 
intentions) 
 Just a few thoroughly-developed internal attributes, accompanied by one or more of the 
following: 
 Extensive detail (such as behavioral implications etc.) 
Change across time (past to present, origin and resolution) 
Verbal expression by the character (only counts for cognitions and emotions) 
 Internal experiences clearly marked as the causes of other internal experiences  
She felt X because she knew Y; “She doesn’t like going to parties because she’s 
focused on school” 
 Basic contrast with the internal experiences of others or reality 
“She wanted a root beer but her dad didn’t want her to have one” 
 Depiction of generalized internal experience pattern  
traits, tendencies, disposition 
 
4. Persons. Persons are portrayed as having sophisticated, complex, rich, and contextualized internal 
experiences, evidenced by one or more of the following: 
 Internal experiences indicating sensitivity to social evaluation 
Embarrassment, pride, shame, shy, “she was afraid they might think she was silly” 
 Intrapsychic conflict/mixed emotions 
“and then she notices her friend is getting involved in all the college-y stuff and she 
doesn’t really know whether or not to step in because it’s her friend’s birthday and 
she wanted her to have a good time.” 
 Rich/detailed contrast with the internal experience of others or reality 
“He tries to convince the robins that this is his branch and his tree but they’re not 
convinced and he decides to fly away and let them, and be the bigger bird and not 
push the conflict any further.” 
 Pronounced empathic responding to the distress of others (not just “felt bad for ___”) 
“And I started crying because my sister was crying about her shot and I just felt so 
bad for her I didn’t want her to hurt” 
 Self-monitoring of expression of internal experiences  
hiding feelings, deception, pretense 
 Insight from introspective reflection/evaluation  
“whenever she tries something on she’s very critical, she’s like hmm no I don’t really 
like this, and her friends are like no it looks good! But she doesn’t believe them…and 
when nothing works she’s like maybe I’m too critical and need to trust my friends.” 
(#104 has more good examples) 
 Thoughtful intentional planning: advanced strategic thinking-ahead (foresight) and/or 
orienting towards  complex goals 
 “and he tried to think of a way to just not get in trouble but have fun” 
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